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11 Introduction
A third of the world’s countries have experienced civil conﬂict since the end of World War II. Civil
war dramatically alters infrastructures, human capital and institutions. It also has a deep and persistent
negative effect on international trade. The end of war constitutes a new starting point for the building of a
peaceful society through the reconstruction of infrastructures, human capital and institutions. An analysis
of this great challenge faced by countries after conﬂict needs to consider the role played by all the parties
involved in the reconstruction. A crucial issue is the role and consequences of foreign intervention in
civil war.
We exploit a dataset on diplomatic intervention in civil war over the post-World War II period. Di-
plomatic intervention is a non-coercive, non-violent and ultimately non-binding form of intervention. It
is a voluntary process where a third party helps antagonists to deﬁne and sign a peaceful agreement. The
context of civil war is a period of great political instability and diplomacy can have a strong inﬂuence on
local politics. In this paper we look whether interveners derive a (commercial) advantage from diploma-
tic intervention ("trade for one?"). The intervener and the target country (the country where a civil war
is ongoing and where intervention occurs) may adopt formal trade preferences or the intervener may use
its intervention to wield certain power and inﬂuence in order to promote bilateral trade. We also examine
whether diplomatic interventions affect trade volumes between the target country and all its trading part-
ners ("trade for all?"). Diplomatic intervention may decrease transaction costs (through the enhancement
of some trade-promoting capital such as institutions, infrastructure rebuilding, trust) and increase trade
between the target country and all its trading partners (i.e. not only with the intervener).
Our results suggest that diplomatic intervention promotes "trade for all" and not "trade for one". We
showthat the intervenerdoes notderive any commercial advantage from diplomatic intervention. In other
words, trade between the intervener and the target country does not increase more than trade between
the target country and its other partners. However, we ﬁnd that diplomatic intervention has a positive and
2persistent effect on trade between the target country and all its partners.
Few empirical papers deal with foreign inﬂuence and international trade. Yeats (1990) compares
African countries and shows that former colonies pay an import price premium on steel to their former
colonizer. A recent paper by Berger et al. (2010) focuses on US trade patterns after CIA interventions
during the Cold War. They show that the share of imports of the target country from the US increases, but
ﬁnd no effect on exports from the target country to the US. They argue that the increase in the imports
of the target country reﬂects a trade diversion and is due to an increase in the intervener’s power and
inﬂuence. Head and Ries (2010) show that trade missions conducted by the Canadian government have
small, negative and mainly insigniﬁcant effects. Our paper completes this literature and studies diploma-
tic interventions as a potential vector of foreign inﬂuence. Whereas the U.S. (through CIA intervention)
and former colonizers take advantage of their inﬂuence, we do not ﬁnd that the intervener derives any
advantage from diplomatic interventions in civil war. Diplomatic interventions affect international trade
in a different way. Trade increases between the target country and all its partners equally. The corollary
of this result is that diplomatic interventions increase trade between the intervener and the target country.
We estimate a gravity equation à la Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) using different methodolo-
gies. Our preferred methodology is the recent one proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2009). This is the
only methodology that allows one to estimate both dyadic and monadic effects, and also takes the multi-
lateral resistance terms into account. The other available methodologies either do not take the multilateral
resistance terms into account or they eliminate the monadic terms. 1
We then show that diplomatic intervention has a "trade for all" effect. Our estimates control for the
persistent effect of civil war on trade. In line with the results of Martin et al. (2008a), we ﬁnd that civil
war has a negative long-lasting effect after the end of civil war. It is important to stress that we estimate
the effect of diplomatic intervention behind the peacemaking effect of diplomatic intervention.
1. The usual gravity equation omits the multilateral resistance terms. Using country-year ﬁxed effect or a difference-in-
difference methodology also eliminates the multilateral resistance terms.
3We also tackle the potential reverse causality problem between diplomatic intervention and trade,
using an instrumental variable approach. The existence and the sign of a reverse causality is uncertain.
Whereastheintervenerislikelytobeamajortradingpartnerofthetargetcountry,diplomaticintervention
may complicate the relationship between the two and even deteriorate bilateral trade. 2
Although we ﬁnd no "trade for one" effect, one would expect the potential effect to lie in the compo-
sition (imports or exports) of trade between the target country and the intervener. We ﬁnd no evidence of
the intervener deriving any advantage for imports. There is no local demand diversion in its favor. Nor do
we ﬁnd any evidence of an advantage for exports. The target country’s access to the intervener’s market
is not favored, compared to other countries.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data on diplomatic
intervention and trade. Section 3 explains the estimation procedure. Section 4 presents our empirical
results regarding the effect of diplomatic intervention. Section 5 focuses on endogeneity issues. Section
6 is dedicated to the institutional channel and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data on diplomatic intervention and trade
We use Regan’s database on third party interventions in civil war over the 1948-2005 period (see
Regan (2002)). Diplomatic intervention is either mediation or a forum. Mediation is a non-coercive, non-
violent, and, ultimately, non-binding form of intervention. The deﬁnition of mediation used to build this
database is borrowed from Bercovitch and Wille (1991) who deﬁne mediation as “a process of conﬂict
managementwheredisputantsseektheassistanceof,oracceptanofferofhelpfrom,anindividual,group,
state, or organization to settle their conﬂict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force
or invoking the authority of the law”. An international forum is a formally organized meeting of the
representatives from several countries whose outcome, in this case, is also non-binding. In our sample,
2. See for instance Greig and Regan (2009).
498% of diplomatic interventions are initiated by a third party and 2% are requested by at least one of the
warring parties. The database reports 119 diplomatic interventions in civil wars (see table 6 in appendix
for a list of these diplomatic interventions). Figure 1 shows that the least developed countries where
civil wars are frequent, are often the targets of diplomatic interventions (in black). Figure 2 depicts the
countries that intervened in civil conﬂict (in grey). The countries with the most developed economies are
the most frequent interveners. The US, at the top of the list, launched 26 diplomatic interventions over
the period. The average lapse of time between intervention and the end of war is 32 months. However,
the lapse of time varies substantially (in 59 cases out of the 119 interventions, civil war ended the year
of the intervention).
FIGURE 1 – Target countries
For civil war, we use Correlates Of War data proposed by Gleditsch (2004) and completed by Regan
(2002) which takes account of civil wars with less than 1,000 deaths per year. 3
3. The dataset contained in Regan (2002) records all the interventions in conﬂicts with more than 200 deaths per year.
5FIGURE 2 – Interveners
3 Estimation procedure and speciﬁcation
3.1 Estimation procedure : monadic and dyadic determinants
In order to estimate the effect of diplomatic intervention on trade, we use the gravity equation for-
mulation. In this section, we describe the different methodologies that we have used and explain why we
prefer Baier and Bergstrand’s methodlogy.
The vast majority of empirical and theoretical formulations of the gravity equation can be summa-







Various theoretical foundations can be found in the literature (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Eaton




jt represent the respective individual attributes of ex-
porter i and of importer j at time t, Gt is a year-speciﬁc factor and φijt represents bilateral determinants.
6We specify the log of the bilateral term φijt as :
lnφijt = δDijt + εijt, (2)
where Dijt represents the observed and εijt the unobserved bilateral trade cost determinants. Taking the





jt + δDijt + ρt + εijt. (3)




jt , the monadic terms, contain the respective GDPs
of the two countries, GDPit and GDPjt but omit the “multilateral resistance terms” derived from the
theoretical gravity model (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004).
To overcome this problem and as the multilateral resistance terms are monadic determinants, most
empirical methodologies to estimate the gravity equation eliminate the monadic terms (through different
strategies). We ﬁrst follow Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and include origin and destination country ﬁxed
effects in the gravity equation to deal with the “multilateral resistance terms” concern. Ideally, these ﬁxed
effects should be time-varying using ﬁxed effects for each exporter-year and importer-year in order to
eliminate the two monadic determinants in (3). However, computational problems arise as this requires
the creation of a large number of dummies. In our case, our data panel over 50 years with 200 countries
involves20,000 dummiesandthe usualSTATAsoftware imposesa limit of11,000independentvariables,
for instance. We then use a “ratios of ratios” methodology (“Tetrad”) as in Head et al. (2010) to eliminate
the monadic terms of the gravity equation. We use this methodology as a ﬁrst estimate of the dyadic effect
of diplomatic intervention on trade between the intervener and the target country.
Eliminating monadic terms is not a concern as long as the empirical application concentrates on the
effectofbilateraldeterminants,thatisDijt.However,ourobjectiveistodeterminetwoeffects:theeffect
of diplomatic intervention on trade between the intervener and the target country (a dyadic determinant)
and the effect of diplomatic intervention on trade between the target country and all its partners (a mo-
nadic determinant). The only methodology that allows one to test the two types of effects (dyadic and
7monadic) is the one proposed in Baier and Bergstrand (2009). They provide a methodology to estimate
the gravity equation à la Anderson and Van Wincoop without eliminating the monadic determinants.
They use Taylor expansions around symmetric trade costs to derive a linear econometrically implemen-
table equation. Following their notations, Tijt is the bilateral trade cost, σ the elasticity of substitution of
consumers’ preferences and the equation of interest is :
ln(Xijt) = β0t + ln(GDPit) + ln(GDPjt) − (σ − 1)lnTijt + (σ − 1)MRTijt + ρt + εijt, (4)




















where θk = GDPkt/GDPW
t . The multilateral resistance term, MRTijt, is an exogenous variable that
takes account of multilateral price effects in the estimation.
We focus on the monadic effects and on the dyadic effect of diplomatic interventions. The monadic
effects will be captured by two dummies. INTXit captures the effect of a diplomatic intervention on
the exports of the target country. It is 1 only if the exporter, i, is the target of an intervention at time
t. INTMjt captures the effect of a diplomatic intervention on the imports of the target country. It is
1 only if the importer, j, is the target of an intervention at time t. This distinction is useful when we
allow for different effects on imports and on exports. When our interest is not in distinguishing exports
and imports, these monadic variables are aggregated into a single dummy variable INTijt. This dummy
variable is 1 if either the exporter i or the importer j experienced an intervention at time t. This variable
allows us to estimate the “trade for all” effect, the impact of diplomatic interventions on trade between
the target country and all its partners (indifferently).
We allow the effect of diplomatic intervention to differ for the intervener country (the “trade for
one” effect) and we introduce dummy variables to capture the differential effect. BILXijt captures
the differential effect of the intervention on the exports of the target country. It is 1 only if country j
8intervenes in country i at time t. BILMijt captures the differential effect of the intervention on the
imports of the target country. It is 1 only if country i intervenes in country j at time t. Again, this
distinction is useful when we allow for different effects on imports and on exports. When our interest
is not in distinguishing exports and imports, these dyadic variables are aggregated into a single dummy
variable BILijt. This dummy variable is 1 if one of the two countries i and j intervenes in the other one
at time t.
3.2 Empirical speciﬁcation
Our objective is to estimate the effect of diplomatic intervention in civil war, using the gravity equa-
tion. Our sample includes three categories of country (their composition changes from one year to the
next) : countries at peace, countries in civil war where no diplomatic intervention occurs and countries
in civil war where a diplomatic intervention occurs. Our objective is to estimate the effect of diplomatic
intervention behind the effect of peace and civil war. We control for the effect of peace and the effect of
civil war and introduce WARijt which is a dummy variable that is 1 only if country i or country j is
experiencing a civil war at time t.
Since civil war has a long-lasting negative effect on trade (Martin et al., 2008a), we think it is appro-
priate to study the persistence of the effect of diplomatic intervention on trade. We include several lags
of the intervention dummy variables (INT and BIL) and then also include lags of the civil war dummy





intINT ijt − e β
′
bilBILijt − e β
′





where µij is a country pair ﬁxed effect. Bold coefﬁcients and bold variables denote vectors. INT ijt is a
vector of lagged dummies (from INTijt−1 to INTijt−k). BILijt and WARijt are coded in a similar
way. CONTROLijt includes RTAijt, a dummy set to 1 if countries i and j are members of the same
Regional Trade Agreement at time t, and CUijt, a dummy set to 1 if countries i and j are members of
9a common Currency Union at time t. Substituting this speciﬁcation into (4), we write our main equation
of interest :
ln(Xijt) = β0t + ln(GDPit) + ln(GDPjt) + β′





mrMRijt + µij + ρt + εijt,





, βI = (1 − σ) e βI for I = int,bil,c. The term MRijt includes the
multilateral terms for all the explanatory variables (excepted for the GDPs). 4 µij is a dyadic ﬁxed effect,
ρt a time dummy, and εijt is the random error term. All MR terms are deﬁned in a similar way as formula
(5).
We also use a second speciﬁcation where we distinguish the effect of interventions on imports (β′
intm
and β′
bilm) and the effect on exports (β′
intx and β′
bilx) of the target country.









mrMRijt + µij + ρt + εijt
The term MRijt includes the multilateral terms for all the explanatory variables (but GDP). 5 Our main
speciﬁcation includes 447,844 observations (dyads) from 1948 to 2005, and 11,054 diplomatic interven-
tions (2.5%), i.e. 119 different diplomatic interventions (for a complete list, see Table 3 in Appendix).
We choose to study the persistence of the intervention effect over a long time scale, and use dummies


























6. Our main regression contains 79 variables and all the multilateral resistance terms. We have 158 variables excluding
time dummies.
10contain a large number of lagged variables (from 1 to k = 15 years) and tables are difﬁcult to read.
We do not present the estimated coefﬁcients for the usual variables of the gravity equation (GDPs and
controls) because they are similar to the usual results found in the literature.
For all our estimates, we take into account both the differential effect regarding trade between the
intervener and the target country and the effect of diplomatic intervention on trade for all the partners of
the target country. However, we prefer to present the results regarding the ﬁrst type of effect (“trade for
one”) and the second type of effect (“trade for all”) separately.
4 Trade for one : does the intervener derive a commercial advantage?
4.1 Results
In this section we present our result on the differential effect of diplomatic intervention for the inter-
vener. Column (A) to (D) in Table 1 presents our estimates of the “trade for one” effect (the estimates
of the 15 parameters included in β′
bil). Column (A) shows our estimates of equation (3) with dyad ﬁxed
effects which control for the time invariant bilateral determinants. Column (B) shows our estimates with
country ﬁxed effects which control for all time invariant monadic determinants. Column (C) shows our
estimates for the “Tetrad” methodology. Using equation (1), a modiﬁed gravity equation is derived for
a ratio to ratios (Xij/Xik)/(Xlj/Xlk) in which two reference countries (k and l) are introduced. The
monadic terms disappear from the theoretical gravity equation. We report average results of tetrad re-
gressions run for all 30 possible combinations of the six countries with the largest number of partners
(France, UK, Germany, USA, Italy, and Netherlands) as the reference importers and exporters. Column
(C) summarizes the results of the 30 regressions by reporting the mean and standard deviation of each
variable’s coefﬁcient. Almost none the coefﬁcients of diplomatic intervention is signiﬁcant (columns (A)
to (C)). In other words, there is no effect of diplomatic intervention on trade between the intervener and
the target country.
11Column (D) shows our estimates of equation (7) (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). We only show here
our estimates of the “trade for one” effect (our estimates of the “trade for all” effects are reported in
Section 5). All the coefﬁcients are non-signiﬁcant (except for the ﬁrst one which is negative). The target
country does not trade more with the intervener than with its other partners. In other words, we reject the
hypothesis that the intervener derives a commercial advantage. We do not identify any bilateral foreign
inﬂuence on the target country.
Even though there is no “trade for one” effect, one may expect the potential effect to lie in the
composition (imports or exports) of trade between the target country and the intervener. We then estimate
speciﬁcation (8). Remember that the difference between speciﬁcation (7) and (8) is that in speciﬁcation
(7) we do not allow for a differential effect between imports and exports of the target country. Column
(E) and (F) in table 1 present our estimates of equation (8) for the “trade for one” effect. They show
our estimates regarding imports and exports of the target country, respectively (the estimates of the
15 parameters included in β′
bilm and the 15 parameters included in β′
bilx). None of the coefﬁcients is
signiﬁcant (but two are negative). In other words, we again ﬁnd no evidence of any advantage for the
intervener. First, there is no effect regarding imports of the target country. Our interpretation is that
there is no local demand diversion in favor of the intervener. Second, we again ﬁnd no evidence of the
intervener deriving any advantage regarding exports of the target country; the target country has no
favored access to the intervener’s market.
We then check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of other control variables (we use
equation (8)). We include dummy variables to control for economic and military interventions and in-
terventions by the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). We also check the
robustness of our result to the introduction of the intervener’s level of development and the intensity of
the conﬂict.
Other types of intervention : One may expect that our results depend on other types of interventions
contemporary with diplomatic interventions. We introduce two vectors of dummies (with 15 lags) to
12TABLE 1 – Estimates of the "trade for one" effect
Estimates Equation (3) Equation (3) Equation (3) Equation (7) Equation (8)
Methodology Dyad FE Country FE Tetrad Baier and Baier and
Head et al. (2010) Bergstrand (2009) Bergstrand (2009)
Column (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
BILt−1 -0.282*** -0.155 -0.286 -0.220** BILMt−1 -0.00937 BILXt−1 -0.300**
(0.0985) (0.132) (0.38) (0.099) (0.143) (0.138)
BILt−2 -0.104 -0.0261 -0.112 -0.0656 BILMt−2 0.0637 BILXt−2 -0.0668
(0.0997) (0.135) (0.31) (0.100) (0.145) (0.139)
BILt−3 -0.140 -0.0101 -0.042 -0.0766 BILMt−3 0.0326 BILXt−3 -0.157
(0.0977) (0.132) (0.34) (0.0985) (0.142) (0.136)
BILt−4 -0.0385 0.0609 -0.0131 -0.0329 BILMt−4 0.0947 BILXt−4 -0.133
(0.0956) (0.129) (0.301) (0.0964) (0.139) (0.134)
BILt−5 0.0121 0.153 0.029 0.00585 BILMt−5 -0.0136 BILXt−5 0.0567
(0.0941) (0.128) (0.261) (0.0948) (0.136) (0.132)
BILt−6 -0.00378 0.132 0.037 0.0151 BILMt−6 0.0484 BILXt−6 0.0487
(0.0941) (0.128) (0.299) (0.0948) (0.136) (0.131)
BILt−7 0.0272 0.190 0.015 0.0711 BILMt−7 -0.0325 BILXt−7 0.174
(0.0967) (0.131) (0.321) (0.0974) (0.140) (0.135)
BILt−8 -0.0487 0.130 -0.026 -0.0405 BILMt−8 -0.148 BILXt−8 0.0837
(0.0984) (0.133) (0.377) (0.0991) (0.142) (0.138)
BILt−9 -0.0120 0.265* 0.016 -0.0139 BILMt−9 -0.209 BILXt−9 0.191
(0.102) (0.138) (0.358) (0.103) (0.146) (0.144)
BILt−10 -0.0448 0.152 0.067 -0.0612 BILMt−10 -0.101 BILXt−10 0.0297
(0.105) (0.142) (0.299) (0.106) (0.151) (0.148)
BILt−11 -0.0791 0.129 0.028 -0.0896 BILMt−11 -0.276* BILXt−11 0.0682
(0.112) (0.152) (0.362) (0.113) (0.158) (0.160)
BILt−12 -0.0591 0.199 0.340 -0.0352 BILMt−12 -0.222 BILXt−12 0.174
(0.118) (0.161) (0.425) (0.119) (0.165) (0.171)
BILt−13 0.0509 0.224 0.165 0.0281 BILMt−13 -0.219 BILXt−13 0.225
(0.125) (0.170) (0.346) (0.126) (0.175) (0.180)
BILt−14 0.0888 0.379** 0.306 0.0843 BILMt−14 -0.0430 BILXt−14 0.157
(0.127) (0.173) (0.498) (0.128) (0.179) (0.182)
BILt−15 -0.0538 0.304* 0.504* -0.0522 BILMt−15 -0.0936 BILXt−15 -0.0699
(0.130) (0.176) (0.406) (0.131) (0.185) (0.184)
WARijt (15 lags) Yes Yes Yes Yes WARijt (15 lags) Yes
MRijt (15 lags) No No No Yes MRijt (15 lags) Yes
Gravity control Yes Yes Yes Yes Gravity control Yes
Bilateral ﬁxed effects Yes No Yes Yes Bilateral ﬁxed effects Yes
Country ﬁxed effects No Yes No No Country ﬁxed effects No
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Time ﬁxed effects Yes
Observations 447,844 447,844 447,844 436,490.3 447,844
R-squared 0.278 0.691 0.280 na 0.293
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Gravity control : Log GDP per capita, Regional Trade Agreement, Common Currency
13controlforeconomicandmilitaryinterventions.Militaryinterventionsrefertointerventionswithmilitary
troops, naval forces, equipment or aid, intelligence or advisors, air support, or military sanctions. We also
introduce United Nations and NGO interventions. Data on NGO interventions are from Regan (2002) and
include diplomatic intervention by the Organization of African Unity, the Inter-Governmental Authority
on Drought and Development and the Catholic Church Economic Community Of West African States. 7
Intervener’s level of economic development : The map represented in Figure 1 shows that interveners are
both developed countries and developing countries. One may think that the inﬂuence of the intervener is
different whether the country is developed or not. We split the sample into two groups. The ﬁrst includes
interveners belonging to the OECD group (over 112,000 observations) and the second group includes
interveners that do not belong to the OECD (330,000 observations).
Intensity of conﬂict : One may also argue that diplomatic interventions occur preferentially in intense
conﬂicts. The need for reconstruction would be greater for countries where diplomatic intervention oc-
curred and this would explain why there is no differential effect in favor of the intervener.
The inclusion of these variables does not change our results; we still ﬁnd no support for a signiﬁcant
“trade for one” effect.
4.2 Endogeneity issues
A ﬁrst possible bias in our estimates is the omission of explanatory variables that inﬂuence both the
decision to intervene and trade ﬂows. Following Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) we use lagged dependent
variables of trade ﬂows to manage the omitted variable bias. We re-estimate all the speciﬁcations adding
one-, two- or three-year lagged bilateral trade ﬂows to control for the possibility that the decision to
intervene depends on past trade ﬂows. Past bilateral trade ﬂows have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on
current trade. However, our results regarding diplomatic intervention are unaffected.
7. The effect of military and economic interventions and NGO’s interventions is ambiguous. The effect is negative for the
ﬁrst years following these types of intervention (some are signiﬁcant) and becomes positive in the long run (12 to 15 years after
the intervention).
14As mentioned in the introduction, one may also suspect that the causal relationship between diplo-
matic intervention and trade ﬂows is reversed because large trade ﬂows may induce the third party to
intervene. The usual methodology to overcome the reverse causality problem is to implement an ins-
trumental variable strategy. We then need to ﬁnd a bilateral time-varying variable that inﬂuences the
decision to intervene but not the residual part of trade. Unfortunately, it is very difﬁcult to ﬁnd a variable
that has no effect on the residual part of trade.
We overcome this problem by using the following strategy. First, we overthrow the relationship and
focus on the effect of bilateral trade ﬂows on the probability of diplomatic intervention. 8 We then correct
for the endogeneity bias using the (two steps) instrumental variable method.
We ﬁrst consider the effect of imports and exports on the probability for each country i to intervene
in country j (which suffers from a civil war) :
Proba(INTijt) = β0 + γ1Mijt + γ2Xijt + γ3CONTij (9)
+γ4CONTijt + γ5CONTit + ρt + εijt
The main variables of interest, Mijt and Xijt, are the import and export ﬂows from i to j at time
t, respectively. We include dyad variables invariant in time (CONTij) as geographic proximity (Log
distance, contiguity) and historical linkages (common language, ex-colony, common colony), and dyad
time-varying variables (CONTijt) for diplomatic relationships (United Nations votes, military al-
liances). We also control for several characteristics of the intervener (Log GDP, military capabilities,
democracy index) included in (CONTit). Time ﬁxed effects are also included (ρt). 9 We restrict our
sample to the years of civil war in country j.
Our estimates are reported in Table 2. In speciﬁcations (1) to (3) we use the logit model. The results
for the ﬁrst speciﬁcation show that imports and exports do not inﬂuence the probability of intervention
8. Greig and Regan (2009) show that the probability for a country to offer a mediation or a forum is decreasing with the
level of trade between two partners. The larger the bilateral trade ﬂow, the lower the probability for the country to launch a
diplomatic intervention (in its partner which suffers from a civil war).
9. See data sources in the appendix.
15(column (1)). In the second speciﬁcation, we add control variables (column (2)). Import and export ﬂows
still show non-signiﬁcant effects, and the coefﬁcients of the control variables have the expected signs :
Geographical distance reduces the incentive to intervene in a civil conﬂict whereas colonial linkages,
military capabilities and GDP of the potential intervener increase the probability of intervention. Speci-
ﬁcation (3) includes dyad ﬁxed effects controlling for bilateral time-invariant determinants of diplomatic
intervention as geographic determinants or historical linkages. The logit method forces us to exclude
countries that have never experienced an intervention and this reduces our sample dramatically. Howe-
ver, we still ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of bilateral trade on the probability of intervention. Column (4)
presents our estimates when the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedure is used and bilateral
ﬁxed effects are included. Again, there is no signiﬁcant effect of bilateral trade on the probability of
intervention. Our results are robust to the inclusion of other controls and the inclusion of lagged import
and export ﬂows. These results suggest that trade does not inﬂuence the probability of intervention.
However, we still have to correct for the reverse causality problem, because γ1 and γ2 from equation
9 may suffer from reverse causality. We correct this bias with an instrumental variable strategy. We use
the log of remoteness for country i and the log of remoteness for country j as an instrument. Remoteness
measures a country’s set of alternative trade partners. Remoteness is a strong predictor of trade ﬂows





where dkl is the distance between country k and country l. We use the remoteness of country i and the
remoteness of country j as instruments for trade ﬂows.
Column (5) in Table 1 presents the estimates of the second stage of the two-step IV procedure.
Exports and imports still have no signiﬁcant effect on the probability of intervention. The ﬁrst step of
the instrumentation indicates that remoteness has the expected negative effect on imports and exports
10. It is often used as an instrument for trade ﬂows (Martin et al., 2008a).
16(columns (6) and (7) in Table 1).
We envision two reasons for this non signiﬁcant effect. First, trade volumes of countries in civil war
are generally small and their share of the trade ﬂows of potential interveners is also generally small.
Second, diplomatic intervention may complicate the relationships between the intervener and the target
country, and may even deteriorate bilateral trade.
5 Trade for all : does diplomatic intervention increase trade?
In this section we present our result on the "trade for all" effect of diplomatic intervention. We ﬁrst
consider speciﬁcation (7). Figure 3 shows the effect of diplomatic intervention on the trade of the target
countries (b βint). 11 The effect of diplomatic intervention is positive after the ﬁrst two years and persists
up to 15 years after the end of civil war (it is above natural trade). 12
The ﬁrst two years’ negative and signiﬁcant effect is quite surprising. We presume that this is due
to the average lapse of time of 32 months between diplomatic intervention and the end of civil war. We
interpret this lapse of time as inversely related to the degree of “success” of the intervention. To give
some insight in this direction, we replace the diplomatic intervention variable, INT ijt, in speciﬁcation
(7) by a new dummy variable (with 15 lags), called “successful intervention”, which is 1 only when a
diplomatic intervention and the end of civil war occur in the same year (59 out of the 119 interventions).
Figure 4 shows our estimates of the effect of this new variable. The ﬁrst two years’ effect is no longer
negative.
We then consider equation (8) to estimate the “trade for all” effect on imports and on exports. Figure
5, in appendix, shows the estimated effect of interventions on the imports of the target country (b βintm).
The effect is generally positive and signiﬁcant. Figure 6, in appendix, represents the effect of intervention
11. The coefﬁcients are smoothed using a one-year window around the year of interest.
12. Our estimates of the long-lasting effect of civil war are consistent with the literature : it is negative and persistent up to
15 years (see ﬁgure 9 in appendix).
17TABLE 2 – The effect of trade on the probability of intervention
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV First Step First Step
Intervention Intervention Intervention Intervention Intervention Log Imports Log Exports
Log Importsijt -0.156 -0.233 -0.277 -0.000281 0.0471
(0.164) (0.178) (0.536) (0.000955) (0.0730)
Log Exportsijt 0.266 0.237 0.648 0.000658 -0.0640
(0.169) (0.183) (0.510) (0.000971) (0.0759)
Un Voteijt 0.600 0.357 1.427 0.00684 0.0179 0.215** 0.318***
(0.488) (0.484) (1.229) (0.00573) (0.0115) (0.105) (0.103)
Military Allianceijt 0.577* -0.258 -1.106 -0.00904 -0.00898 -0.0914 -0.0674
(0.338) (0.368) (1.355) (0.00801) (0.0101) (0.147) (0.144)
Log GDPit -0.113 0.239 1.926 6.69e-05 0.00710 0.404*** 0.405***
(0.112) (0.146) (1.304) (0.00323) (0.00591) (0.0590) (0.0581)
Democracy Indexit -0.0262 -0.0272 0.0445 -0.000376 -6.25e-05 0.0230*** 0.0216***
(0.0262) (0.0275) (0.135) (0.000294) (0.000425) (0.00540) (0.00532)
Militaries Capabilitiesit 23.62*** 22.53*** -69.05 -0.317 -0.214 0.579 2.037















Observations 7,928 7,928 378 9,578 9,103 9,578 9,578
Estimation Method Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dyad ﬁxed effect no no yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
F-Tests on IVs - - - - 22.36 - -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
18on the exports of the target country (b βintx). The effect is positive and signiﬁcant after the third year
following the intervention. Hence the ﬁrst two years’ negative effect of diplomatic intervention on trade
is driven by a negative effect on the exports of the target country. When we estimate the effect of the
“successful intervention” variable for imports and exports, the negative ﬁrst two years’ effect disappears
(see Figure 7 and Figure 8 in appendix). This result is consistent with Regan (1996, 2002) who argues
that unsuccessful diplomatic interventions may increase tension between parties involved in civil war and
have a negative effect on trade in the ﬁrst year after the diplomatic intervention. Our estimates control for
the persistent effect of civil war on trade. Like Martin et al. (2008a), we ﬁnd that civil war has a negative
long-lasting effect (see Figure 9 to Figure 11 in the appendix). Our results are robust to the inclusion
of the additional control variables presented in Section 4.1 (other types of intervention, the intervener’s
level of economic development and the intensity of conﬂict).
The positive “trade for all” effect and the lack of evidence of a “trade for one” effect can be ex-
plained by the “quality of institutions” channel. Diplomatic intervention may induce an improvement
of local institutions. Collier (2006) argues that the intervener plays an important role in the institutional
rebuilding of the target country. The intervener can provide institutional alternatives and assistance from
skilled personnel. After civil war, the different parties share power and responsibility for rebuilding the
country’s institutions. In a preliminary version of this paper, Couttenier and Soubeyran (2010) show that
diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on the quality of institutions in post-civil war countries. It
may seem logical that the improvement in the quality of the institutions of the target country has a po-
sitive effect on trade ﬂows between the target and all its partners. This is consistent with the literature
on institutions and trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show that corruption and imperfect contract
enforcement reduce imports. The index of bad institutional quality (high degree of corruption, bad in-
vestment climate or inefﬁcient judicial system) acts as a hidden tax on imports or increases the ﬁxed
costs of entry (Levchenko, 2007).
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6 Conclusion
This paper has considered the effect of diplomatic intervention in civil war on trade. We have esti-
mated a gravity equation using the Baier and Bergstrand methodology in order to estimate the bilateral
and the multilateral effects of diplomatic intervention on trade (controlling for the multilateral resis-
tance terms). We have shown that diplomatic intervention promotes “trade for all” and not “trade for
one”. Indeed, the intervener does not beneﬁt from a privileged trading relationship with target countries,
and diplomatic intervention affects the trade ﬂows of the target countries (diplomatic intervention has
a positive effect on exports and imports of these countries). We presume that these effects are due the
enhancement of trade-promoting capital such as institutions.
20Appendix A : Data sources
For the usual gravity variables we use various sources. We use International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) data augmented by Martin et al. (2008b) for the aggregated trade
variables. The Regional Trade Agreements data are from Vicard (2009), the Currency Union data from
Jose de Sousa 13, gross domestic product (GDP) from the World Bank (World Development Indicator)
completed by Barbieri (2002). For the geographic variables we use the CEPII bilateral distance database
(www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). The “Military capabilities” variable
is from Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/) and is the mean of six country
components : energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel,
total population and urban population. The “Alliances” variable is also from Correlates Of War and is
coded 1 if dyad shares a defensive, neutrality, non-aggression or entente alliance at year t. The UN votes
correlation annual database, available for 1946 to 1996, is from Gartzke (http://dss.ucsd.edu/
~egartzke/). The democracy index is from the Polity IV database; it ranks each country on a -10
(autocratic) to +10 (democratic) scale.
13. http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm
21Appendix B : Data on diplomatic intervention description : Intervener and
target countries
Intervener Target Country Year Year End Intervener Target Country Year Year End Intervener Target Country Year Year End
of Conﬂict of Conﬂict of Conﬂict
U.k Cyprus 1963 1964 Spain Guatemala 1987 1987 Ghana Liberia 1995 1996
USA Cyprus 1964 1964 USA Ethiopia 1989 1991 Nigeria Liberia 1995 1996
U.k Cyprus 1964 1964 France Cambodia 1989 1997 Canada Sri lanka 1995 2001
Sudan Ethiopia 1964 1964 Thailand Myanmar 1989 1995 Norway Sri lanka 1995 2001
USA Dominican Rep. 1965 1965 Zimbabwe Mozambique 1989 1992 Netherlands Sri lanka 1995 2001
Gabon Nigeria 1969 1970 Kenya Mozambique 1989 1992 USA Sudan 1995 2004
Switzerland Nigeria 1969 1970 USA Sudan 1989 1993 USA Burundi 1996 1998
Libya Chad 1969 1971 Norway Guatemala 1990 1990 Russia Moldova 1996 1996
Egypt Jordan 1970 1970 USA Liberia 1990 1991 Gabon Chad 1996 1996
Somalia Uganda 1972 1972 Italy Mozambique 1990 1992 Russia Tajikistan 1996 1999
U.k Cyprus 1974 1974 USA Ethiopia 1991 1991 Gabon Congo 1997 1999
Zambia Zimbabwe 1974 1975 USA Liberia 1991 1991 Zaire Congo 1997 1999
Sudan Ethiopia 1975 1991 Italy Mozambique 1991 1992 USA U.k 1997 1998
Indonesia Philippines 1975 1992 Zaire Rwanda 1991 1994 Russia Tajikistan 1997 1999
Zambia Zimbabwe 1975 1979 Nigeria Sudan 1991 1994 Iran Tajikistan 1997 1999
USA Lebanon 1976 1990 Nicaragua El Salvador 1991 1992 Tanzania Burundi 1998 1998
Libya Lebanon 1976 1990 Djibouti Somalia 1991 1997 USA U.k 1998 1998
Syria Lebanon 1976 1990 Zimbabwe Mozambique 1992 1992 Thailand Cambodia 1998 1998
USA Zimbabwe 1976 1979 Italy Mozambique 1992 1992 Japan Cambodia 1998 1998
U.k Zimbabwe 1976 1979 Tanzania Rwanda 1992 1994 France Yugoslavia 1998 2001
USA U.k 1977 1977 Nigeria Sudan 1992 1994 USA Yugoslavia 1998 2001
U.k Zimbabwe 1977 1979 USA Somalia 1992 1997 Italy Yugoslavia 1998 2001
USA Zimbabwe 1977 1979 USA Georgia 1993 1994 Germany Yugoslavia 1998 2001
Jordan Iran 1978 1982 Spain Guatemala 1993 1993 Uk Yugoslavia 1998 2001
USA Lebanon 1978 1990 Norway Guatemala 1993 1993 South Africa Zaire 1998 2000
France Lebanon 1978 1990 Ukraine Moldova 1993 1993 Egypt Sudan 1999 2004
USA Nicaragua 1978 1978 Tanzania Rwanda 1993 1994 Canada Sudan 1999 2004
Dominican Rep. Nicaragua 1978 1978 Belgium Rwanda 1993 1994 U.k Yugoslavia 1999 2001
Guatemala Nicaragua 1978 1978 Nigeria Sudan 1993 1994 France Yugoslavia 1999 2001
USA Zimbabwe 1978 1979 Russia Bosnia and Herz. 1994 1995 South Africa Zaire 1999 2000
U.k Zimbabwe 1978 1979 Russia Georgia 1994 1994
U.k Zimbabwe 1979 1979 Ghana Liberia 1994 1996
Canada El Salvador 1981 1992 USA Rwanda 1994 1994
Mexico El Salvador 1982 1992 Kenya Sudan 1994 1994
India Sri lanka 1983 1986 Iran Tajikistan 1994 1997
France Chad 1983 1988 Egypt Yemen 1994 1994
Colombia El Salvador 1984 1992 U.k South Africa 1994 1994
USA El Salvador 1984 1992 USA South Africa 1994 1994
Congo Chad 1984 1988 France Bosnia and Herz. 1995 1995
India Sri lanka 1984 1986 Germany Bosnia and Herz. 1995 1995
Kenya Uganda 1985 1988 Russia Bosnia and Herz. 1995 1995
Spain Guatemala 1986 1987 USA Bosnia and Herz. 1995 1995
India Sri lanka 1986 1987 U.k Bosnia and Herz. 1995 1995
India Sri lanka 1987 1987 USA U.k 1995 1995
22Appendix C : An illustration of variable constructions
Table 3 provides an illustration of the procedure we use to build our 6 main variables. We consider
bilateral trade (Xij, with i = A,B,C, and i  = j). In this case country A intervenes at time t in country
B where a civil war is ongoing (target country).
We allow the effect of diplomatic intervention to differ for the intervener country (the “trade for one”
effect) and introduce dummy variables to capture the differential effect. BILM captures the differential
effect of the intervention on the imports of the target country. It is 1 only if country A intervenes in
country B at time t. BILX captures the differential effect of the intervention on the exports of the
target country. It is 1 only if country A intervenes in country B at time t. When our interest is not in
distinguishing exports and imports, these dyadic variables are aggregated into a single dummy variable
BIL. This dummy variable is 1 if one of the two countries A and B intervenes in the other one at time t.
The monadic effects are captured by two dummies. INTM captures the effect of a diplomatic inter-
vention on the imports of the target country. It is 1 only if the importer, B, is the target of an intervention
at time t. INTX captures the effect of a diplomatic intervention on the exports of the target country. It
is 1 only if the exporter, B, is the target of an intervention at time t. When our interest is not in distingui-
shing exports and imports, these monadic variables are aggregated into a single dummy variable INT.
This dummy variable is 1 if either the exporter A or the importer B experienced an intervention at time
t. This variable allows us to estimate the “trade for all” effect, the impact of diplomatic interventions on
trade between the target country and all its partners (indifferently).
23TABLE 3 – An illustration for data coding
i j Year Trade BIL BILM BILX INT INTM INTX
A B t XAB 1 1 0 1 1 0
C B t XCB 0 0 0 1 1 0
D B t XDB 0 0 0 1 1 0
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
B A t XBA 1 0 1 1 0 1
B C t XBC 0 0 0 1 0 1
B D t XBD 0 0 0 1 0 1
A intervenes in B.
XAB represent the exports from A to B.
Appendix D : Graphical Results
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